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Executive Order  
68. 2814/A

27 June 1968

The Honorable Paul C. Warnke  
Assistant Secretary of Defense  
(International Security Affairs)  
Department of Defense  
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Mr. Warnke:

Mr. Helms has asked me to convey to you our views with regard to the proposals contained in your letter of 11 June 1968, in which you forward a scenario and study outline for an examination of the relative force capabilities of NATO and the Warsaw Pact to be undertaken in line with an agreement of the NATO Defense Ministers.

While the Agency is ready to provide whatever assistance it can to this effort, we have some reservations as to the advisability of the effort at this time.

The scenario strikes us as unrealistic. It assumes an ability, not only within the U.S. Government but also among the NATO countries, to agree and progress on complex and controversial matters at a rapid rate. The scenario, for example, allows only 24 working days--15 July to 15 August--for the Drafting Group (which does not yet exist) to prepare and submit its first draft. None of our experience

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gives us any confidence that this schedule could be met except under the most demanding circumstances.

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This brings me to our next reservation. Because the core of any NATO-Warsaw Pact force comparison lies in the assessment of the Central Region, the examination falls heaviest upon those in CIA and DIA responsible for analyzing Soviet and Pact ground forces.

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These are the same persons who are deeply involved in a joint reassessment of the Soviet ground forces and their ability to reinforce in the Central Region. This undertaking--to which both CIA and DIA have given the highest priority--was requested by the Secretary of Defense.

The work of the joint study is not yet finished. Nor, by its nature, can it be greatly accelerated. Any substantial diversion of resources now wholly applied to the joint study to engage in the comparison exercise would adversely affect the progress of the work. If there is to be a diversion, we should have a restatement of priorities by the Secretary of Defense.

The relationship of the joint study to the proposed examination is important in another way. As you know, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director of Central Intelligence have agreed to limit the use and distribution of the information coming out of the joint study. The recent Memorandum to Holders of NIE 11-14-67, for example, was released 25X1X7 and then only on specific understandings as to its use. If U.S. work on the comparison is to be based on the joint study rather than on agreed NATO intelligence found in MC 161/68, these ground rules will need to be redefined.

I will be glad to discuss these comments with you, or you may want to have your representatives contact Mr. Bruce C. Clarke, Jr., Director of the Office of Strategic Research, who will represent CIA in the discussion and activity relating to the examination of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces.

I am sending copies of this letter to Mr. Leddy and General Carroll.

Sincerely,

/S/ Rufus Taylor

Rufus Taylor

Vice Admiral, U. S. Navy

Deputy Director

cc: Director, DIA

Assistant Secretary, EUR/State

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Concur:

/s/ R. J. Smith 26 June 1968

R. J. Smith

Deputy Director for Intelligence

OSR:BC Clarke, Jr.:lm/7111 (25 June 68)

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